
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
Python and R package management in TREs



James Robinson, Senior RSE (<u>jrobinson@turing.ac.uk</u>)

Data Safe Haven

Data Safe Haven project



Data Safe Haven project

Infrastructure as code


Building a deployable, reproducible infrastructure

Information governance & standards

An accompanying IG framework that is standardised, auditable, accessible and practical

Community building

An open-first community that empowers contributions from all stakeholders



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Data Safe Haven project

Infrastructure as code


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
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Data Safe Haven architecture


- Hub-and-spoke model
- Central management component
 - Identity service
 - Authentication
 - Package repository access
- Per-project research environments
 - Compute
 - Databases
 - Collaborative tools



- Reproducible deployments
- Productive research environments
- Open to contributions rather than pushing 'our' work

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Security tiers



Personal data that could threaten safety, security, health Data likely to be attacked by state actors

Weakly pseudonymised personal data

Data likely to be attacked by individuals or small groups

Strongly pseudonymised or synthetic personal data Commercial or legal risk

Low risk from disclosure (e.g. having research scooped)

Publicly available, open information

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Software Packages

Tiered approach

- Low-risk projects can install any package
 - from upstream repositories
- Medium-risk projects can install any package
 - through local proxies
- High-risk projects can install a subset
 - managed allowlist of available packages

Why not allow all packages?

- Typo-squatting
 - scikit-learn vs. scikit-learn
- Malware hijacking
 - Insertion of malware into widely-used package
- Ransomware hijacking
 - Insertion of ransomware into widely-used package
- Targeted attacks
 - Dedicated package that targets your TRE in particular


Which packages to allow?

- Identify packages that are:
 - widely-used
 - well-maintained
- Use this to generate a list of core packages
- Add all dependencies of above packages
- Allow users to install from this allowlist

Package vetting process


- User makes a package request with supporting information:
- Package details:
 - Name
 - Audience
 - Number of authors
 - Download statistics
 - List of dependencies
- Explanation of why this package is needed
 - Why can't existing packages do this?
 - Does this replace another package or is it supplementary?
- Discussion between maintainers and requester continues:
 - request is either approved or denied

Request for Arrow (R package) to be added to the Tier 3 approve list working in tier 3 SRE #1388



Automation

- Use <u>Powershell script</u> to generate dependencies
 - Take information from
 libraries.io and rstudio.com
 - Script freely available: BSD licence
- Script generates GitHub PR
 - One commit with changes
 - Project owners able to approve or deny



Typo-squatting

- Pre-defined list of allowed packages
- We provide a default list
- Can be customised for each project
- Packages can be easily added or removed

STOPPED BY ALLOWLIST

Malware hijacking

- Most often via dependencies
- Likely to be short-lived for highly-used packages
- Attacks typically aim to exfiltrate data:
 - Bitcoin wallets
 - SSH keys
 - Passwords
- Attempts should be caught by standard protection
 - Restricted network connectivity
 - Scanning of outgoing connections

PyTorch Dependency Confusion Attack

In December 2022, PyTorch disclosed a malicious dependency posing as a legitimate library in their popular machine learning framework. The attack targeted users who installed PyTorch-nightly via Linux pip between December 25, 2022 and December 30, 2022, and worked using a namespace or dependency confusion tactic.

"cobo-python-api" targeted developers using Mac computers

Another attack in PyPI applied dependency confusion attempting to trick developers into downloading a tainted version of the crypto library Cobo Custody Restful in cobo-python-api. The package does not have an official distribution through PyPI, so

CAUGHT BY OTHER MEASURES

Ransomware hijacking

- Importance depends on how system is set-up
- In our case this is mitigated:
 - Regular system backups
 - Easy for us to teardown and redeploy

MITIGATED BY SYSTEM DESIGN

Targeted attacks

- Package contains code/data designed to attack your system from inside
- Must come from someone who knows your system well
 - Safe Users: How much do you trust your users/admins?
 - What sanctions can you apply in cases of misuse?
- Must be added to the package allowlist
 - What is your approval process?
- Blocking access to this package will not stop a malicious user
 - It might make their job harder though

MITIGATED BY POLICIES

Discussion Points

Eliminating risk

- It is not possible to completely eliminate risks from malicious users
- Users with access to a Turing-complete programming language can still attack your system

What can/should be done to mitigate risks?

Common approved packages

- Currently no common set of approved packages
- We are interested in helping to develop one

Is anyone from this community interested in this?

Summary

- Give different projects different levels of access to packages
- Start with a core package list and generate dependencies
- Open and easy process for users to request new packages
- Interested in working with others to build common solutions


Backup

Our 'North Star'

To remove barriers to working **safely** and **effectively** with sensitive data,


by promoting and demonstrating a culture of open, community-led development

of interoperable foundational infrastructure and governance.



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Open codebase





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Enabling high-quality research

- Single batteries-included environment
- Developed based on user requirements
- Scalable compute including GPUs
- Data in databases and/or cloud storage
- Access to subset of PyPI and CRAN
- Servers for version control, and collaborative document writing



















































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Getting Involved









Email contact